The only reason a country goes to war is for control of resources, it is not for noble reasons.
A few minutes to talk with you briefly about WAR! Many people think that war is the worst atrocities of the planet and we’ll get to whether or not at this minute I want to dispel the notion that wars are fought for noble reasons and this is what we are told that the government says it is our duty is our responsibility etc, etc, etc.
Nonsense! The only one reason why wars are ever fought, that is for control of resources and those resources might include Oil, Natural Gas, arable land, access to seaports and Slaves. Slaves are free sources for which many wars and history makes it very clear. When you study history closely you will see this is so
The Floating Dollar as a Threat to Property Rights
Seth Lipsky is the founding editor of the New York Sun. A graduate of Harvard College, he served in the U.S. Army in Vietnam as a combat correspondent for Pacific Stars and Stripes. A former senior editor and member of the editorial board of The Wall Street Journal, he has also served as editorial page editor of The Wall Street Journal/Europe, managing editor of The Asian Wall Street Journal, and assistant editor of Far Eastern Economic Review. In 2009, he published The Citizen’s Constitution: An Annotated Guide.
The following is adapted from a speech delivered on February 16, 2011, at a Hillsdale College National Leadership Seminar in Phoenix, Arizona.
TO BEGIN, consider one of the most important measures of property, the kilogram. It’s a measure of mass or, for non-scientific purposes, weight. According to the papers last week, a global scramble is under way to define this most basic unit after it was discovered that the standard kilogram—a cylinder of platinum and iridium that is maintained by the International Bureau of Weights and Measures—has been losing mass.
You may think that this is impossible. Of all the elements, iridium is the most resistant to corrosion, and the cylinder is kept in a facility at Sevres, France, where it is under three glass domes accessible by three separate keys. The cylinder itself is more than 130 years old and is what the New York Times calls the “only remaining international standard in the metric system that is still a man-made object.” The new urgency to redefine the kilogram comes from the fact that its changing mass “defeats,” as the Times put it, “its only purpose: constancy.”
The question I invite you to consider for a moment is what would happen if we just let the kilogram float? This is a question that was posed in an editorial last week in the New York Sun. After all, the editorial said, we let the dollar float. The creation of dollars, and the status of the dollar as legal tender, is a matter of fiat. Its value is adjusted by the mandarins at the Federal Reserve, depending on variables they only sometimes share with the rest of the world. This would have floored the Framers of our Constitution, who granted Congress the power to coin money and regulate its value in the same sentence in which they gave it the power to fix the standard of weights and measures—like, say, the aforementioned kilogram.
Now, the record is clear in respect of how America’s founders viewed money. Many of them went into the Second United States Congress, where they established the value of the dollar at 371 ¼ grains of pure silver. The law through which they did that, the Coinage Act of 1792, noted that the amount of silver they were regulating for the dollar was the same as in a coin then in widespread use, known as the Spanish milled dollar. The law said a dollar could also be the free-market equivalent in gold. The Founders did not expect the value of the dollar to be changed any more than the persons who locked away that kilogram of platinum and iridium expected the cylinder to start losing mass. In fact, in this same 1792 law, they established the death penalty for debasing the dollar.
Today, members of the Federal Reserve Board don’t worry about how many grains of silver or gold are behind the dollar. They couldn’t care less. And this is what I believe is the most worrisome threat to property rights today. When the value of a dollar plunges at a dizzying rate—at one point in recent months it collapsed to less than 1/1,400 of an ounce of gold—Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke goes up to Capitol Hill and declares merely that he is “puzzled.” No “new urgency” to redefine the dollar for him. The fact is that we’ve long since ceased to define the dollar, and it can float not only against other currencies but even against 371 ¼ grains of pure silver.
So, the New York Sun asked, why not float the kilogram? After all, when you go into the grocery to buy a pound of hamburger, why should you worry about how much hamburger you get—so long as it’s a pound’s worth? A pound is supposed to be .45359237 of a kilogram. But if Congress can permit Mr. Bernanke to use his judgment in deciding what a dollar is worth, why shouldn’t he—or some other Ph.D. from M.I.T.—be able to decide from day to day what a kilogram is worth?
No doubt some will cavil that the fact that the dollar floats makes it all the more reason for the kilogram to be constant. But what’s so special about the kilogram? If the fiat dollar floats, one has no idea what it will be worth when it comes time to spend it. If the kilogram also floats, it will simply be twice as hard to figure out what something we’re buying will be worth. So what if, when we unwrap our hamburger, the missus has to throw a little more sawdust in the meatloaf?
Or let us consider a compromise. Let’s go to a fiat kilogram—that is, permit the kilogram to float—but apply the new urgency to fixing the dollar at a specified number of grains of gold. To those who say it would be ridiculous to fix the dollar but let the butcher hand you whatever amount of hamburger he wants when you ask for a kilogram, I say, what’s the difference as to whether it’s the measure of money or of weight that floats?
For that matter, one could go all the way and fix the value of both the kilogram and the dollar but float the value of time. You say you want to be paid $100 an hour. That’s fine by your boss. But he—or Chairman Bernanke—gets to decide how many minutes in the hour. Or how long the minute is. You know you’ll get a kilogram of meat for the price a kilogram of meat costs. But you won’t know how long you have to work to earn the money.
There was obviously a satirical element to that Sun editorial. But it’s not satirical to say that we are in a dangerous situation in our country in respect of the dollar, and that property rights are very much bound up in the question of money. After all, consider that kilogram. It is a cylinder. And it’s a cylinder the size of, say, a golf ball. The amount of mass that it is believed to have lost is measured in a few atoms, and yet the institution where they maintain standards is in a complete tizzy about it. The implications are said to be enormous.
The dollar, by contrast, has collapsed from 1/35 of an ounce of gold to less than 1/1,300 of an ounce of gold. If the kilogram had collapsed on that order of magnitude, there would be left only a small shard of that handsome grayish cylinder under the three glass domes at Sevres, France.
I understand that this is not where the property rights discussion is usually focused. It usually centers around the takings clause of the Constitution—the clause at the center of the landmark case that erupted when condemnation proceedings were launched against the homes in New London, Connecticut, of a woman named Susette Kelo and her neighbors. Under the Fifth Amendment, the government is prohibited from taking private property for public use without just compensation. That is a bedrock principle of American constitutionalism. What was special about Susette Kelo is that her property was taken for private use. It was coveted by a private, non-profit development corporation for private, for-profit use near a big pharmaceutical development that the town reckoned would benefit the public.
Mrs. Kelo and her neighbors went all the way to the Supreme Court to try to keep their homes. She lost the case, Kelo v. New London, albeit by a five to four vote. On the one hand, it was a terrible defeat for the principle of property rights. On the other hand, the decision was so alarming that states have begun changing their own laws to strengthen protections against the kind of raid on private property that Mrs. Kelo suffered. At least 43 states have already passed such laws. Rarely has the loser in a Supreme Court case established so great a legacy as Mrs. Kelo, whose case is one of the most important warnings we have had in my generation of the vigilance that is going to be required in respect of the right to property enshrined in the Fifth Amendment.
Which brings me to the question of how the law can be used to illuminate the problem of the floating dollar. What I consider the most astonishing legal question in the country came into the news in 2008, when Judith Kaye, the chief judge of the highest court in the state of New York, the Court of Appeals, filed a lawsuit in an inferior court, asking it to order the state legislature and the governor to give her a raise.
My first reaction, and that of my colleagues at the Sun, was to consider this something of a joke. Yet the more we began to look at the case, the more it threw into sharp relief the issue of the right to the property that comes to us in the form of a salary or is held by us in the form of savings. The judges on New York’s Court of Appeals, after all, hadn’t had a raise in more than a decade, and they were having an ever harder time making their salaries cover rising costs. In that they are just like the rest of us.
But it turns out that under the Constitution, judges are not quite like the rest of us—and in a way that lies at the heart of the American Revolution. Indeed, in the Declaration of Independence, one of the reasons our Founders listed for breaking with England was that King George III had “made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries.” So they wrote into the Constitution not only that judges would have life tenure (with good behavior), but also that the pay of a judge would not be diminished during his term in office. This principle that one can never lower the pay of a judge is also in many state constitutions.
So if in, say, the year 2000 a judge was paid in dollars that were worth 1/265 of an ounce of gold, and if today that same judge is being paid with dollars worth less than 1/1,300 of an ounce of gold, has the judge’s pay been diminished?
The more I’ve thought about it, the more I have been nagged by the thought that judges’ pay could be the device with which to attack the legal tender law I have come to regard as the greatest threat to property in America. This is the law establishing that paper money in America must be accepted in payment of debts, public and private. The Founders themselves hated paper money. Washington, whose picture is on the one dollar bill, warned that paper money would inevitably “ruin commerce, oppress the honest, and open the door to every species of fraud and injustice”; Jefferson, whose picture is on the two dollar bill, called its abuses inevitable; as did Madison, whose picture is on the $5,000 bill. Paper money, he said, was “unconstitutional, for it affects the rights of property as much as taking away equal value in land.”
I’m not so sure that the existence of paper money is the problem. The problem is the requirement that a one dollar paper note be accepted in lieu of 371 ¼ grains of silver. Certainly when the greenback was introduced—as it was by President Lincoln—it was for a cause, the Union, that was worth enormous risks. The Treasury Secretary who helped him put through the greenback as a war measure, Salmon Chase, became, in 1864, the sixth Chief Justice of the United States; and when the concept of legal tender finally came up for consideration, Chase ruled against the greenback. President Grant, however, eventually got two new justices on the court, and legal tender was established in a series of rulings—one involving the purchase of some sheep, the other of some bales of cotton, and another some land—known as the Legal Tender Cases.
A few months ago, I called Bernard Nussbaum, who was representing Judge Kaye, and asked him why she didn’t challenge legal tender head on. He told me he feared the Legal Tender Cases couldn’t be overturned. It was too heavy a lift. So instead he fought the case on separation of powers grounds. It seems that the New York legislature had said it would not give the judges of New York a raise until the legislators got a raise. The judges sprang on this as a transgression of separation of powers—and, no surprise, when they heard their own case, they ruled against the legislature. A few weeks ago, the legislature decided to delegate to an independent commission the job of deciding judges’ pay.
By my lights, this delegation to an unelected body, even if the legislature could overrule it, was an unsatisfactory outcome. But it turns out that the judges of New York are not the only jurists who are furious about the diminishment of their pay. A group of federal judges is also in court, fighting over their salaries. In the case of the federal judges, Congress had some time ago enacted a law that gave them an automatic pay increase designed to keep up with the Consumer Price Index. But then, as deficits got out of control and Congress’s own salary lagged, Congress suspended the automatic pay increase.
At that point, a coalition of federal judges went into court. Their aim is limited: to force Congress to reinstate the automatic pay adjustment. To understand the scale of what one is talking about, consider the pay of but one of the plaintiffs, Judge Silberman. I don’t know his exact salary. But at the time he was assigned to the District of Columbia Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals, the salary of a federal appeals judge—$83,200—was worth 258 ounces of gold. Since then, the value of the pay of a judge of one of the Appeals circuits—$184,500—has been diminished to 139 ounces of gold.
At this very hour, the judges’ petition in their pay case is before the United States Supreme Court. And while I believe the justices have been wronged by Congress, I hope they lose on the question of whether a suspension in the automatic pay adjustment is unconstitutional. That should get them angry enough to come back and look legal tender in the face. They could force Congress to pay them in the gold or silver equivalent of a federal judge’s salary at the time they were appointed to the bench. It would move judges closer to the kinds of salaries the lawyers before them are receiving.
And people would start to ask: If judges deserve honest money, why shouldn’t the rest of us?
To those who suggest that such a scenario is far-fetched, one can say, no more far-fetched than the notion that the post-Civil War monetary system could be erected on Supreme Court decisions in a pair of disputes over payment for a flock of sheep and some bales of cotton. Or that centuries of law on abortion could be overturned in a fell swoop by a Supreme Court ruling in the case of a woman who later changed her mind. Could the court cast aside precedent to decide such a sweeping issue as legal tender? It certainly didn’t hesitate—nor should it have—in demolishing the notion that racially separate schools could be equal. With everyone from the United Nations to Communist China today calling for the abandonment of the dollar as a reserve currency, is it so hard to imagine that the Supreme Court might revisit the Legal Tender Cases?
It may be that the judges will lose their pay case, just as Susette Kelo lost her house, or that they will win a partial victory and the Supreme Court will shy away from confronting legal tender. But we know from Mrs. Kelo’s case that this needn’t be the end of things. People began to see the logic and think about property rights, and now at least 43 states have passed laws to make it harder for state and local jurisdictions to use the power of eminent domain to seize private land for someone else’s private use.
Could such a thing happen with money? Well, there is a part of the Constitution called Article I, Section 10. It is the section that lists the things that states can never do. And one of these prohibited activities is making legal tender out of something other than gold or silver coin. So what is happening now is that a growing number of states, watching the sickening plunge in the value of federal money, are starting to explore how they can set up monetary systems based on gold or silver coins. The most recent effort was launched in Virginia, where there is a bill before the General Assembly to set up a joint committee to study the question. There have been early stirrings—just stirrings—in the legislatures of several other states.
Could the entry of the states into the monetary role be a reaction to a failure at the federal level, the way the states reacted to the failure of the Supreme Court to enforce Susette Kelo’s Fifth Amendment rights? It would be inaccurate to make too much of these efforts. But it would be shortsighted to make too little of them. Strange things can happen. It is even possible that one can take a cylinder of platinum and iridium, lock it away in a room under three glass domes, secure it with three separate keys, and come back in a few years to discover that part of it has disappeared. And the New York Times will write an editorial about the value of constancy.
Copyright © 2010 Hillsdale College. The opinions expressed in Imprimis are not necessarily the views of Hillsdale College. Permission to reprint in whole or in part is hereby granted, provided the following credit line is used: “Reprinted by permission from Imprimis, a publication of Hillsdale College.” SUBSCRIPTION FREE UPON REQUEST. ISSN 0277-8432. Imprimis trademark registered in U.S. Patent and Trade Office #1563325.
PRESS RELEASE
Bob Podolsky to be Interviewed and discusses The Titania Project
On Sunday, May 8 at 5pm ET, Robert Podolsky will be interviewed on Corey Moore’s show, Voice Of Radical Dissent, to talk about the Titania Project. The Call in number is (858) 216-3433. This project is the fruit of more than 25 years of scientific research concerning the true nature of the massive problems currently facing humanity – and a potential solution to those problems.
The show will explain why the efforts of most “freedom activists” are DOOMED to FAILURE – be they Anarchists, Libertarians, Constitutionalists, Zeitgeist, Republic for the United States, Tea Party or mainstream political activists. Only when the true or root problem is known can a solution EVER be formulated. Most Groups focus on the problems within government in the belief that political action can FIX government – BUT
Government CANNOT be “fixed”. It does exactly what it was designed to do! Those that think otherwise, are still trapped in the MATRIX!
As Robert will explain, there is a viable alternative to government and its attendant hierarchies. Robert sometimes refers to this alternative as “organized anarchy” – and while this sounds to the uninitiated like an oxymoron, it is not. The word, “anarchy” means the absence of government. It does NOT mean the absence of organization – though proponents of government would have you think so. There are many non-hierarchic ways that groups can be organized, in the absence of government, to achieve ethical outcomes – and he will be talking about the most effective means in existence today.
To get more information about Bob Podolsky, read up on his background. He has extensive training and work experience in a broad range of scientific fields; and on May 8 you can tune in to his talk at http://lrn.fm/ Your feedback is welcome and desired!
For further media contacts t i t a n i a_ p r o j e c t a t y a h o o d o t c o m 602-434-1725
Charley Reese’s final column for the Orlando Sentinel.
He has been a journalist for 49 years. He is retiring and this is HIS LAST COLUMN.
By Charlie Reese
Politicians are the only people in the world who create problems and then campaign against them.
Have you ever wondered, if both the Democrats and the Republicans are against deficits, WHY do we have deficits?
Have you ever wondered, if all the politicians are against inflation and high taxes, WHY do we have inflation and high taxes?
You and I don’t propose a federal budget. The President does.
You and I don’t have the Constitutional authority to vote on appropriations. The House of Representatives does.
You and I don’t write the tax code, Congress does.
You and I don’t set fiscal policy, Congress does.
You and I don’t control monetary policy, the Federal Reserve Bank does.
One hundred senators, 435 congressmen, one President, and nine Supreme Court justices equates to 545 human beings out of the 300 million are directly, legally, morally, and individually responsible for the domestic problems that plague this country.
I excluded the members of the Federal Reserve Board because that problem was created by the Congress. In 1913, Congress delegated its Constitutional duty to provide a sound currency to a federally chartered, but private, central bank.
I excluded all the special interests and lobbyists for a sound reason. They have no legal authority. They have no ability to coerce a senator, a congressman, or a President to do one cotton-picking thing. I don’t care if they offer a politician $1 million dollars in cash. The politician has the power to accept or reject it. No matter what the lobbyist promises, it is the legislator’s responsibility to determine how he votes.
Those 545 human beings spend much of their energy convincing you that what they did is not their fault. They cooperate in this common con regardless of party.
What separates a politician from a normal human being is an excessive amount of gall. No normal human being would have the gall of a Speaker, who stood up and criticized the President for creating deficits. The President can only propose a budget. He cannot force the Congress to accept it.
The Constitution, which is the supreme law of the land, gives sole responsibility to the House of Representatives for originating and approving appropriations and taxes. Who is the speaker of the House? John Boehner. He is the leader of the majority party. He and fellow House members, not the President, can approve any budget they want. If the President vetoes it, they can pass it over his veto if they agree to.
It seems inconceivable to me that a nation of 300 million cannot replace 545 people who stand convicted — by present facts — of incompetence and irresponsibility. I can’t think of a single domestic problem that is not traceable directly to those 545 people. When you fully grasp the plain truth that 545 people exercise the power of the federal government, then it must follow that what exists is what they want to exist.
If the tax code is unfair, it’s because they want it unfair.
If the budget is in the red, it’s because they want it in the red.
If the Army & Marines are in Iraq and Afghanistan it’s because they want them in Iraq and Afghanistan …
If they do not receive social security but are on an elite retirement plan not available to the people, it’s because they want it that way.
There are no insoluble government problems.
Do not let these 545 people shift the blame to bureaucrats, whom they hire and whose jobs they can abolish; to lobbyists, whose gifts and advice they can reject; to regulators, to whom they give the power to regulate and from whom they can take this power. Above all, do not let them con you into the belief that there exists disembodied mystical forces like “the economy,” “inflation,” or “politics” that prevent them from doing what they take an oath to do.
Those 545 people, and they alone, are responsible.
They, and they alone, have the power.
They, and they alone, should be held accountable by the people who are their bosses.
Provided the voters have the gumption to manage their own employees…
We should vote all of them out of office and clean up their mess!
Charlie Reese is a former columnist of the Orlando Sentinel Newspaper.
This might be funny if it weren’t so true.
Be sure to read all the way to the end:
Tax his land,
Tax his bed,
Tax the table,
At which he’s fed.
Tax his tractor,
Tax his mule,
Teach him taxes
Are the rule.
Tax his work,
Tax his pay,
He works for
peanuts anyway!
Tax his cow,
Tax his goat,
Tax his pants,
Tax his coat.
Tax his ties,
Tax his shirt,
Tax his work,
Tax his dirt.
Tax his tobacco,
Tax his drink,
Tax him if he
Tries to think.
Tax his cigars,
Tax his beers,
If he cries
Tax his tears.
Tax his car,
Tax his gas,
Find other ways
To tax his ass.
Tax all he has
Then let him know
That you won’t be done
Till he has no dough.
When he screams and hollers;
Then tax him some more,
Tax him till
He’s good and sore.
Then tax his coffin,
Tax his grave,
Tax the sod in
Which he’s laid…
Put these words
Upon his tomb,
‘Taxes drove me
to my doom…’
When he’s gone,
Do not relax,
Its time to apply
The inheritance tax.
Accounts Receivable Tax
Building Permit Tax
CDL license Tax
Cigarette Tax
Corporate Income Tax
Dog License Tax
Excise Taxes
Federal Income Tax
Federal Unemployment Tax (FUTA)
Fishing License Tax
Food License Tax
Fuel Permit Tax
Gasoline Tax (currently 44.75 cents per gallon)
Gross Receipts Tax
Hunting License Tax
Inheritance Tax
Inventory Tax
IRS Interest Charges IRS Penalties (tax on top of tax)
Liquor Tax
Luxury Taxes
Marriage License Tax
Medicare Tax
Personal Property Tax
Property Tax
Real Estate Tax
Service Charge Tax
Social Security Tax
Road Usage Tax
Recreational Vehicle Tax
Sales Tax
School Tax
State Income Tax
State Unemployment Tax (SUTA)
Telephone Federal Excise Tax
Telephone Federal Universal Service Fee Tax
Telephone Federal, State and Local Surcharge Taxes
Telephone Minimum Usage Surcharge Tax
Telephone Recurring and Nonrecurring Charges Tax
Telephone State and Local Tax
Telephone Usage Charge Tax
Utility Taxes
Vehicle License Registration Tax
Vehicle Sales Tax
Watercraft Registration Tax
Well Permit Tax
Workers Compensation Tax
STILL THINK THIS IS FUNNY?
Not one of these taxes existed 100 years ago, & our nation was the most prosperous in the world. We had absolutely no national debt, had the largest middle class in the world, and Mom stayed home to raise the kids.
The Nightmare German Inflation
One day everything was fine. The next day hell was unleashed.
Foreword: The many parallels between 1924 Germany and present-day United States are cause for concern. Though the U.S. has not yet reached the depths to which Germany descended in that era, few can look at the constant depreciation of the dollar since the early 1970′s and fail to be alarmed. It seems contemporary America differs from 1924 Germany only in the duration between cause and effect. While the German experience was compressed over a few short years, the effects of the American inflation have been more drawn out.
In my view, this has occurred for two good reasons:
First, American central bankers have learned enough from the German experience to delay and extend the consequences of printing too much fiat money.
Second, Germany was a small state isolated from the rest of the world, a pariah nation of sorts following World War I. As a result, it had a difficult time finding a market for its government bonds. German deficits had to be financed internally — a difficulty which greatly accelerated the printing of fiat currency.
Up until recently, the United States enjoyed a strong world-wide demand for its government paper. Thus, the negative affects of government deficits have been subdued. Now, with consistently low interest rates, and a growing fear globally that U.S. deficits may have run out of control, foreign support for the U.S. bond market has faltered. In the absence of international buyers, the Fed could be forced to monetize an ever larger portions of the debt — the modern equivalent of printing money.
Whether or not the situation will slip out of control is a matter for debate. The trend, however, is alarming. The largest annual contribution to the outstanding public debt during the Nixon years was $30.9 billion; Ford – $87.2 billion; Carter – $81.2 billion; Reagan – $302 billion; Bush(Sr.) – $432 billion; Clinton – $347 billion; GW Bush – $1,017 billion; Obama – $1,885 billion.
As this report points out, the correlation between deficits and inflation is sacrosanct — deficits lead to inflation and uncontrolled deficits lead to uncontrolled inflation. Whether or not there will be a Nightmare American Inflation remains to be seen. Let it be said though that the trend is not favorable.
The survivors of the German debacle did so by purchasing gold early in the process. As a citizen and an investor, the best you can do is prepare, and then hope that it doesn’t happen here. This report of Germany’s hyperinflation, originally published in 1970 by Scientific Market Analysis, could play an important part in your preparation process. There is little doubt it will affect your thinking.
- Michael J. Kosares
_______________________
Introduction
If history teaches anything, it is that government cannot be trusted to manage money. When currency is not redeemable in gold, its value depends entirely on the judgment and the conscience of the politicians. (That is the situation in this country today.)
Especially in an economic crisis or a war, the pressure to inflate becomes overwhelming. Any alternative may seem politically disastrous. Whether it be the Roman emperors repeatedly debasing their coinage, the French revolutionary government printing a flood of assignats, John Law flooding France with debased money, or the Continental Congress issuing money until it was literally “not worth a Continental,” the story is similar. A government in financial straits finds its easiest recourse is to issue more and more money until the money loses its value. The entire process is accompanied by a barrage of explanations, propaganda and new regulations which hide the true situation from the eyes of most
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German national currency (1920s)
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people until they have lost all their savings. In World War I, Germany — like other governments — borrowed heavily to pay its war costs. This led to inflation, but not much more than in the U.S. during the same period. After the war there was a period of stability, but then the inflation resumed. By 1923, the wildest inflation in history was raging. Often prices doubled in a few hours. A wild stampede developed to buy goods and get rid of money. By late 1923 it took 200 billion marks buy a loaf of bread.
Millions of the hard-working, thrifty German people found that their life’s savings would not buy a postage stamp. They were penniless. How could this happen in a highly civilized nation run at the time by intelligent, democratically chosen leaders? What happened to business, to wages and employment? How did some people manage to save their capital while a few speculators made fortunes?
The Years 1914-1921
When the war broke out on July 31, 1914, the Reichsbank (German Central Bank) suspended redeemability of its notes in gold. After that there was no legal limit as to how many notes it could print. The government did not want to upset people with heavy taxes. Instead it borrowed huge amounts of money which were to be paid by the enemy after Germany had won the war, Much of the borrowing was discounted and monetized by the Reichsbank. As explained later, this amounted to issuing straight printing press money.
By the end of the war, the amount of money in circulation had increased four-fold. In view of this, the extent of inflation was less than one might have expected. The consumer price index had risen 140% by December 1918. This was equal to the inflation during the same time in England, a little more than in the United States, but less than in France. Yet the floating debt of the Reichsbank had increased from 3 billion to 55 billion marks!
Why was inflation kept within bounds? For the same reason that it got off to a slow start in the Unites States during World War II. Necessities were rationed and luxury goods were not easily available. Millions of men were at the front and not in the market for goods. Civilians worked hard and had little leisure for spending. People saved money against peace time, and in some cases to evade taxes. But the fuel for inflation was accumulating in the form of vast hoards of money.
Wholesale Price Index
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The harsh reparation payments imposed on Germany led the mark to depreciate against foreign currencies. Also, the new democratic socialist leaders had promised the people all types of bounties–increased wages, reduced hours, an expanded educational system, and new social benefits. But all this meant a vastly increased demand on a limited production capacity.
For these reasons inflation resumed after the peace until by February 1920 the price level was five times as high as it had been at the armistice. Yet during this same time the amount of currency in circulation had only doubled. Prices were in fact rising much faster than the rate at which money was being printed. Therefore, reasoned the officials, the price inflation could hardly be blamed on the government. Actually, as we shall see, the ebb and flow of confidence can play a big role in the short-term trend of prices. Confidence in the mark had weakened. At the same time, and as a consequence, billions of hoarded marks came out of hiding and entered the marketplace. The accumulated fuel was burning.
By February 1920 this inflationary episode had run its course. For the next fifteen months the price index held stable. The mark actually gained in value against foreign currencies, so that prices of imported goods fell by some 50%. Here was a golden opportunity to establish a stable currency. However, during these fifteen months the government kept issuing new money. The currency in circulation increased by 50% and the floating debt of the Reichsbank by 100%, providing fuel for a new outbreak.
In May 1921, price inflation started again and by July 1922 prices had risen 700%. The Reichsbank continued printing new currency, although more slowly than the rate at which prices were rising. In fact, all through this period the issue of currency proceeded at a fairly smooth steady rate, while the price index moved up in great surges, interspersed by periods of stability.
After July 1922 the phase of hyperinflation began. All confidence in money vanished and the price index rose faster and faster for fifteen months, outpacing the printing presses which could not run out money as fast as it was depreciating.
The Years 1922-1923 — Hyperinflation!
From Mid-1922 to November 1923 hyperinflation raged. The table above tells the story. Seemingly Reichsbank officials believed that the basic trouble was the depreciation of the mark in terms of foreign currencies. In late 1922 they tried to support the mark by purchasing it in the foreign exchange markets. However, since they continued printing new currency at a feverish rate, the attempt failed. They merely succeeded in buying worthless marks in return for valuable gold and foreign exchange.
All hope of checking the collapse of the mark vanished in January 1923 when the French–alleging treaty violations–occupied Germany’s key industrial district, the Ruhr. Germany subsidized the occupied companies and financed an expensive program of “passive resistance.” New billions of marks were printing to finance these heavy new costs. By late 1923, 300 paper mills were working top speed and 150 printing companies had 2000 presses going day and night turning out currency.
Under the forced draft of inflation, business was now operating at feverish speed and unemployment had disappeared. However, the real wages of workers dropped badly. Unions obtained frequent increases, but these could not keep pace. Workers –domestics, farm workers and various white collar groups– fared especially badly. They had no unions to fight for pay boosts for them, and often they were reduced to hunger. Many people showed visible signs of malnutrition. Skilled workers, writers, artisans and professionals found their wages lagging until they reached the unskilled worker level, which often meant the bare minimum needed to support life.
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Lining up at the bakery early before prices went up
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Businessmen began to abandon their legitimate occupations to speculate in stocks and in goods. Thousands of small businessmen tried to eke out a living by speculating in fabrics, shoes, meat, soap, clothing–in any produce they could obtain. Each fall in the mark brought a rush to the shops. People bought dozens of hats or sweaters.
By mid-1923 workers were being paid as often as three times a day. Their wives would meet them, take the money and rush to the shops to exchange it for goods. However, by this time, more and more often, shops were empty. Storekeepers could not obtain goods or could not do business fast enough to protect their cash receipts. Farmers refused to bring produce into the city in return for worthless paper. Food riots broke out. Parties of workers marched into the countryside to dig up vegetables and to loot the farms. Businesses started to close down and unemployment suddenly soared. The economy was collapsing.
Meanwhile, middle-class people who depended on any sort of fixed income found themselves destitute. They sold furniture, clothing, jewelry and works of art to buy food. Little shops became crowded with such merchandise. Hospitals, literary and art societies, charitable and religious institutions closed down as their funds disappeared.
Then by a mere effort of will, the government stepped in and stabilized the currency overnight.
Throughout the “miracle of the Rentenmark” the depreciation halted in its tracks, business revived, the inflationary spree was ended although, as we shall see, there was a nasty hangover yet to come.
Millions of middle-class Germans–normally the mainstay of a republic–were ruined by the inflation. They became receptive to rabid right wing propaganda and formed a fertile soil for Hitler. Workers who had suffered through the inflation turned, in many cases, to the Communists. The biggest beneficiaries of this enormous redistribution of wealth were feudalistic industrial leaders who distrusted the democracy and who proved willing to deal with Hitler, thinking that they could control him. The democratic parties and the labor unions lost their capital and were weakened. The liberal democratic regime was discredited.
What caused the inflation?
Our thesis is simple: The inflation was caused by the government issuing a flood of new money, causing prices to rise. Then, as the inflation gained momentum, events seemed to demand the printing of larger and larger issues of currency. To half the process would have taken political courage, and this was lacking. As usual, the true facts were hidden behind a barrage of excuses, explanations and propaganda laying blame on everyone except the true culprit.
First, it would be wrong to think that everyone was opposed to inflation. Many big business leaders accepted it cheerfully. It wiped out their debts. They knew how to protect themselves and even profit–by speculating in foreign exchange, by converting money into goods and fixed plant, by borrowing money from the bank and using it to buy up cheap stocks and competing companies. Their wage costs, in true value, decreased, swelling their profits. Yet many workers also thought that they were benefiting, at least in the earlier stages of the inflation. Their wages were increased, and it took time before they recognized that, with prices soaring even faster, they were actually suffering a cut in true income.
A crew of speculators arose who traded in goods and foreign exchange, they had a vested interest in continued inflations. And the government could not help realizing that the inflation was wiping out its burden of debt and would ease its financial problems.
Above all, it became an article of faith among the political leaders and most ordinary citizens that the inflation was really due to the burden of reparation payments imposed by the peace treaty. This meant, so the argument ran, that Germany would be stripped of its gold, foreign exchange and wealth; it would be bankrupt. Hence, the mark fell in value in terms of gold or dollars. This drop in the foreign exchange value of the mark was said to be the true reason for the inflation.
The German leaders felt that the collapse of the mark was proving how impossible it was for Germany to pay the reparations which were demanded. Stabilization of the mark would have spoiled this “proof.” Especially after France occupied the Ruhr in January 1923, it was felt that the destruction of the mark was somehow a blow against the hated occupier–the only patriotic response available to disarmed Germany.
Finally, inflation seemed to bring prosperity. In 1921, when the rest of the world was in a severe post-war recession, production indices in Germany rose sharply. Late in 1921 the mark stabilized temporarily, and business promptly weakened. By early 1922 the mark was sliding again, and business immediately revived. People were buying goods as fast as they obtained money; companies rushed to expand plants and turn money into fixed investment. Germany was actually envied for its “prosperity” by many foreigners.
[Ed. Note: Does this sound like modern-day America, albeit with people spending on stocks in addition to goods?]
The mechanism of inflation was simple. The government issued paper promises to pay, and the Reichsbank issued money on the security of these promises. When a government spends more than its income, it must borrow. If it merely borrows money from its citizens by selling them bonds, there need be no inflation. Instead of that money being spent or invested by the citizen, it is borrowed and spent by the government, but the total amount of money is not increased.
When the government needs more money than its people are able or willing to lend it, it monetizes the debt. That is what happens in this country when the government runs a big deficit. The Federal Reserve (our central bank) “buys” as many bonds as necessary to stabilize the market. It prints money on the security of these bonds. Despite the facade of the government supposedly “borrowing,” the net result is the creation of printing press money. (Actually these days the money is created in the form of new bank deposits–checkbook money–but the net result is exactly the same as if bills were printed.)
This is what happened in Germany. The government issued notes which were promptly discounted by the Reichsbank, i.e., the bank issued money on the “security” of these worthless notes. To compound the evil, the bank failed to raise its interest rate sufficiently. Businessmen found it very profitable to borrow money from the bank and buy up goods, shares and companies. Their debt was wiped out within weeks by the rapid inflation, and the businessman remained holding the valuable assets he had bought. The net result was a huge “private inflation” caused by the rapid expansion of credit. Even foreign exchange was bought with borrowed money, so that the Reichsbank actually financed speculation against its own currency. Yet the bank refused to raise interest rates, arguing that this would only add to the cost of business and thus would increase inflation!
The tax system virtually broke down. Businessmen found that by merely delaying tax payments, the depreciation in the mark would virtually eliminate their true value. But the government, lacking adequate income, felt forced to resort more and more to creating money. By October 1923, 1% of government income came from taxes and 99% from the creation of new money.
But the main force which gave inflation its momentum was the steady decrease in the true value of money in circulation. This has been observed in all past rapid inflations and it is vital to understand it if inflation is to be coped with. During the war, as we saw, the price inflation lagged behind the rate at which money was issued. But now, as people lost confidence, prices began jumping much faster than the government could generate new money. Thus the total circulating currency fell drastically when measured in terms of its true value. One economist stated that, “In proportion to the need, less money circulates in Germany now than before the war. This statement may cause surprise but it is correct. The circulation is now 15-20 times that of pre-war days, whilst prices have risen 40-50 times.” In fact, the total currency when calculated in gold value fell from 7428 million marks in January 1920 to a mere 168 million by July 1923.
Despite the proliferating billions of trillions of marks, the average citizen found it harder and harder to get enough money for necessities. Banks, short of money, could not honor checks. Businessmen were strapped for money to buy materials and meet payrolls. The government faced the same problem. It appeared that there was not too much money around, but rather much too little. The clamor for more money grew on all sides. It seemed that any halt to the printing presses would bring business to a standstill and throw millions of workers out on the street. The government itself would be unable to carry on. Riding a tiger, it dared not dismount. On October 25, 1923, the Reichsbank noted that it had that day printed 120,000 trillion marks. Unfortunately, the day’s demand had been for one million trillion. However, it announced that it was expanding production and the daily issue would soon be 500,000 trillion!
Once people lose confidence in a currency, they try to get rid of it. As Lord Keynes pointed out, this makes circulation speed up enormously, and hence prices rise faster than the government can print new money. Marshall, studying this process, concluded that, “The total value of an ‘ inconvertible paper currency cannot be increased by increasing its quantity; any increase in quantity which seems likely to be repeated will lower the value of each unit more than in proportion to the increase.”
Customarily, however, governments blame everyone and everything except themselves for inflation. When inflation lags behind issue of money, as it did in the war, they say that this shows that the issue of money is not dangerously high. Later, when confidence vanishes, and prices soar ahead of currency issues, that again is taken to prove that the government is not to blame–it is only reluctantly issuing money that is desperately needed in view of rising prices.
We will conclude this discussion with a quotation from Dr. Milton Friedman’s book, Dollars and Deficits. Friedman notes that after the Russian revolution, the Bolsheviks introduced a new currency. They printed huge amounts of it and soon it became almost worthless. At the same time some of the older Czarist currency still circulated and maintained its value in terms of goods. It appreciated enormously in terms of the new money. Why? This money was not redeemable. Nobody expected the Czarist government to return. Why did this currency hold up? “Because,” says Friedman, “there was nobody to print any more of it.”
Effects of Inflation on Business
As inflation proceeded, people rushed to buy goods and get rid of their depreciated money. For similar reasons, businessmen hastened to buy machinery, to build new factories, to buy huge stocks of coal, steel and other raw materials. Those who had access to credit borrowed heavily for these purposes, and inflation wiped out their debt. There was a tremendous conversion of working capital into fixed investments. Business was booming and unemployment virtually vanished until the last stages of the inflation.
Farmers got rid of currency by heavy purchases of equipment, and later many were left holding large supplies of useless machinery. Shipbuilding was expanded beyond all market needs. Marginal mines were opened leading to serious overproduction later on. But while basic industries prospered, there was a severe depression in consumer goods industries such as textiles, meat, beer, sugar and tobacco. Too many workers and persons on fixed incomes had lost their purchasing power.
There was a tremendous move toward concentration of industry. Large firms or combinations found it much easier to raise prices, to obtain raw materials and above all to obtain bank credit. Also, they could issue “notgeld” or emergency money which more and more came to replace the paper mark as a medium of exchange. Some of these new industrial combinations were rational and efficient, but many were purely speculative operations. A new breed of financier arose.
Earlier the great German industrial leaders–men like Krupp, Thyssen and Siemens–had developed basic new ideas in technology or in organization. But now the rising stars were those of shrewd speculators and manipulators geared to quick trading and to jumping from deal to deal and from company to company. The most successful were those who saw the trend of events early, who borrowed to the hilt and bought up goods, shares and companies at bargain prices. Conglomerates sprung up forty years before the heyday of the conglomerate movement in the U.S. Perhaps the biggest operator of the day, Hugo Stinnes, formed a giant conglomerate including companies in oil, coal, steel, shipyards, electrical works, insurance, newspapers and hotels. He died in 1924, just before his empire fell apart in the cold winds of the stabilization period. Most of these new mushroom combinations and conglomerates were speculative bubbles which were only able to survive as long as they benefited from ongoing inflation.
Beneath the surface of prosperity there was enormous waste and inefficiency. Much of the new capital plant proved inefficient or unneeded. Middlemen multiplied like locusts, and more and more time and energy went to speculation and to endless paperwork generated by currency fluctuations, new tax law regulations and labor disputes. Speculation caused banks to multiply; there were 100,000 bank workers in 1913 and 375,000 in 1923. Labor became much less productive. Workmen were pre-occupied with their own problems of trading, getting wage boosts, and staying ahead of inflation. With paper wages rising rapidly and full employment, they were less inclined to work hard. Despite the surface boom, net production was really much less than before the war.
Bewildering fluctuations in costs prices and wages made it impossible to allocate resources and production rationally. More and more, the businessman became a speculator in goods and currencies. However, very few businesses failed, since their debts were constantly wiped out by inflation. Bankruptcies had run to 815 per month in 1913; by late 1923 they were 10 per month.
Finally, however, in the last stages of the inflation, the economy began to collapse. Retailers could not get goods or else could not sell at a profit. The money they received was depreciating too fast. Farmers stopped selling their produce. More and more stores became empty. Now unemployment began to soar.
Some economists argued that inflation may have helped Germany by stimulating the building of capital plant and the rationalization of industry. But much of this investment proved to have no value except in the dream world of inflation. Most of the inflation combinations fell apart after stabilization. On the whole, much energy and wealth was wasted in unproductive channels–speculation, paperwork and unprofitable equipment. The working capital of industry was largely dissipated, making that much harder the eventual process of economic rebuilding and rationalization.
Stabilization–The Rentenmark Miracle
In November 1923, a currency reform was undertaken. A new bank, the Rentenbank, was created to issue a new currency–the Rentenmark. This money was exchangeable for bonds supposedly backed up by land and industrial plant A total of 2.4 billion Rentenmarks was created, and each Rentenmark was valued at one trillion old paper marks. From that moment on the depreciation stopped–the Rentenmarks held their value; even the old paper marks held stable. Inflation ceased.
What was the secret of the “miracle of the Rentenmark”? After all, the new currency was not redeemable in anything. Its backing by real property was a fiction, since there was no way by which property could be foreclosed or distributed. Further, there we have the government distributing a vast new supply of money–2.4 billion trillion in terms of the old mark. Ought that not have led to a new wild inflation?
To understand this, we must recall that the real value of the money circulating in late 1923 was small–equal to a mere 168 million pre-war gold marks. The continued depreciation at this point was due to utter lack of confidence–to the belief that the printing presses would run indefinitely. But actually there was a great shortage of and need for money. New money could be introduced without price inflation if only people had confidence in it. How was confidence developed?
First, the government announced that the new currency would be “wertbestaendig”–stable in value. In their hunger for usable money people accepted this, at least until it should be proven false. Then the property backing seemed to give the currency value. True, the Assignats of the French Revolution, backed by fixed property, had depreciated, but still the backing helped.
Second, and certainly most important, the government limited strictly the amount of Rentenmarks which could be issued and it halted the issue and discounting of notes and the creation of paper marks. Finally, after April 1924, the Reichsbank stopped the expansion of credit to businesses which had been stimulating inflation. Businessmen were required to repay loans in gold marks, equal to the original value of the loan. Thereafter, incentive was gone to borrow except for legitimate needs.
In August 1924 the reform was completed by introduction of a new Reichsmark, equal in value to the Rentenmark. The Reichsmark has a 30% gold backing. It was not redeemable in gold, but the government undertook to support it by buying in the foreign exchange markets as necessary. Drastic new taxes were imposed, and with the inflation ended, tax receipts incr
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Playing with money
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eased impressively. In 1924-1925 the government had a surplus.
After the stabilization, most companies found that they were critically short of working capital. Their funds had been dissipated or converted into goods and plant, and cash was very short. They could no longer rely on a stream of incoming capital at the cost of bond holders and workers. Taxes were again a serious burden, as were wage agreements that had been made under the inflation.
In other ways the business climate changed. Now there was a huge demand for consumer goods, but the capital goods industries which had so overexpanded in the inflation were depressed. Huge stocks of coal, steel and other materials which had been accumulated were a drug on the market. Agriculture and building, however, flourished.
Many of the speculative and conglomerate companies which had been formed in the inflation were unable to survive. They failed, or split up into their original components. In 1923 there had been only 263 bankruptcies; in 1924 there were 6,033. Most of the great inflation speculators were ruined or faded from the business scene. However, strong, well-organized companies like Krupp and Thyssen which had resisted overexpansion and speculation were able to weather the stabilization period and to thrive.
How Investments Fared
At the start it is important to understand how hard it was to obtain real income during the inflation. Professionals, skilled workers and others used to enjoying good income found their real salaries disastrously cut. Those who depended on savings, pensions or investment income for a living faced a terrible situation.
Interest from bonds or savings deposits soon depreciated to where they had no real value. Stocks paid meager dividends or none at all; corporate managements needed the money for working capital, or used it for capital building and speculation. Owners of rental property fared no better; the government froze rents, which soon meant that tenants were occupying premises virtually rent-free. Dipping into capital led to big losses, since cash, bonds and even stocks quickly shrunk drastically in value. The urgent need for income had important effects on the true prices of various types of property and investments.
Cash: Money held in cash lost value rapidly and soon became completely worthless. Of all investment forms, this was the most disastrous.
Bank Deposits: In theory, bank deposits became as worthless as cash. However, after the stabilization the government decreed partial reimbursement, and sums in the range of 15-30% of the original deposit value were repaid. Naturally, however, the great majority of depositors withdrew their funds at some time during the inflation, after much of the value had been lost, and exchanged them for goods. Few Germans held money in deposits through the entire period.
Bonds, Mortgages: As usual in an inflation, bonds and mortgages fell in value even faster than cash. After the stabilization, some restitution was provided by law. Holders of government bonds were reimbursed to the extent of 2.5% of the original bond values. Mortgage holders also received some repayment, while a 1925 law provided for 15-25% reimbursement of corporate bondholders, though the payment was delayed for some years. Here again, few investors held bonds or mortgages throughout the entire period; most holders got rid of them for whatever pittance they would bring during the inflation.
Real Estate: Farmers and holders of urban property seemed to benefit if their property was mortgaged; the inflation soon wiped out the mortgage debt. However, they received no income, as noted above, since rents were frozen. After the stabilization, heavy new taxes and the urgent need for cash forced most holders to remortgage their property, often more heavily than originally, so that their gains were illusory. Still, those who held real estate throughout managed to save the capital thus invested. However, those who sold during the inflation (often through desperate need for cash) fared poorly. Because it brought no income, real estate sold at extremely low real price levels during inflation.
Foreign Exchange: Those who held funds in dollars, pounds or other stable currencies, or in gold,saved their capital. The government set up rigid exchange controls as the inflation proceeded. As usual under such conditions, a black market flourished. The ones who fared best were the small minority who had the foresight to exchange marks into foreign money or gold very early, before new laws made this difficult and before the mark lost too much value.
Personal Property: Capital was preserved by those who early changed it into objects of lasting value–rare coins, stamps, jewelry, works of art, antiques–or into merchandise such as clothing, fabrics, etc. Of course, most people did not understand the advantage of accumulating such property until the inflation was well along. By that time the prices of all goods had risen so much that they seemed outrageously bad bargains. In the event, however, cash proved an even worse bargain.
Common Stocks: In an inflation, common stocks are generally considered a desirable hedge to protect against or even to profit from the rise in prices. In practice, it is not so simple. In this country stock prices have been known to fall violently just when inflation was most evident (1946, 1957, 1966, 1969). Market fluctuations–the rise of exciting new speculative stocks, waves of fear or greed–all make it much too easy to buy or to sell at the wrong time or to go into the wrong stocks.
Getting down to specifics, we can say that those who bought a well-diversified list of stocks in solid, well-established companies quite early in the inflation and who held on throughout the period and also through the stabilization crisis saved much or all of their capital. However, there were many pitfalls along the wayside for the greedy, the fearful and the over-clever. Those who did best were investors with a certain unemotional, stolid character, a basic confidence that strong, well-managed companies would come through, and an immunity to excitement, anxiety and speculative temptations.
Many very sharp but brief advances and declines in the market led to widespread speculation, and well-intentioned investors often wound up as traders. Naturally most of them did as badly as amateur speculators generally do. Many decided that speculation was the only sensible approach; when the entire economy and financial structure was visibly crumbling, who could wait patiently with confidence in the long-range value of anything?
Could it Happen Here?
Since 1939 the general price levels have gone up some 200% in this country. Much of this inflation was due to the government generating large amounts of money to pay for three wars. You can be absolutely certain that if we are involved in any further wars for big increases in military spending, there will be new inflationary surges. Modem governments do not dare to impose the taxes needed to pay for war. They find it much easier politically to inflate instead.
The most recent wave of inflation, which got underway in 1965, was triggered by enormous expansion in spending for the Vietnam war. The government ran deficits as big as $25 billion, and much of this debt was monetized by a process similar to that by which the Reichsbank monetized the German government’s debt. The main difference is that the newly generated money shows up mainly as bank deposits instead of printed currency. Since bank demand deposits are in fact money, convertible into currency and usable for any type of purchase, the net result is the same.
At the same time that Vietnam war spending mushroomed, our government undertook a vast program of expensive social welfare spending. It was argued that this country could afford guns and butter. The result was an inflation which already has imposed a 20% capital tax on all savings held as cash, bonds, insurance and on pension payments and other fixed income.
Now, in March 1970, the government and the Federal Reserve have been fighting for a year to check the inflation. Thus far, they have succeeded in slowing down the economy, but prices have continued rising as fast as ever. The reason is simple. Inflation has developed momentum. Many people, especially businessmen, have no faith that the government will stick to its policy. They look for more boom and inflation ahead. Hence, they have continued to get rid of money as fast as possible and convert it into goods, machinery and factory buildings. Even though our manufacturing plant is already in excess in needs and is being utilized at only 82% of capacity, the building boom continues. The reasons are precisely those which led to this behavior in the German inflation.
The late 1960s also saw the rise of a new breed of financial speculator. Huge conglomerates were organized, often with heavy borrowing, taking advantage of inflationary trends. Although their stocks soared in 1967-1968, even a hint of possible deflation and a cooler economy led to drastic declines of 60-80% in 1969. Many reported serious losses or sharply lower earnings. We believe that many of these companies could not survive a period of recession and deflation. Further, some bankruptcies in a few huge, prominent speculative companies could set off a chain reaction and a financial crash. And that is where the great danger of a wild inflation lies.
Today the public expects and demands that the government must maintain prosperity and full employment. If a very severe business slump developed, Washington would have no choice at all–it would have to spend huge sums for relief, public works, to pay off mortgages, etc. Yet at the same time tax payments would drop sharply as business profits disappeared. Taxes could hardly be raised under such circumstances. What would the President do? Turn on the printing presses? What else could he do? [Editor's note: As a reminder, after this report was written, the redeemability of the dollar for gold was terminated in 1971, two Oil Crises struck in 1973 and 1979, and massive Cold War expenditures characterized the 1980's.]
Ironically enough, we think that all this could be triggered by the anti-inflation campaign. It may prove all too successful. The money managers in Washington are aiming at a mild cooling down in business. This would reduce spending and investment, and hopefully would slow down the rate of price escalation. We think that it may work for a while and to a degree. Unhappily it poses tremendous danger.
During the last several years of inflationary boom, debt has gone far too high. Government, individuals and especially businesses have borrowed and spent without limit. In an inflationary period, this makes sense. At the same time liquidity is at an all-time low. Cash and government bills are less than 20% of the current liabilities of business against a normal 40-50% (and 90% right after the war).
The danger is that some of the especially vulnerable businesses will get into deep trouble and that the trouble will spread. In 1954, 1958 and 1960 the economy could stand a moderate recession without its escalating into something worse. In 1970 this may no longer be the case. The trend toward illiquidity and dangerously high debt has proceeded for twenty years, and other figures indicate that the breaking point is near. It might come very soon, or not for many months or even a year or two. Who can tell just when some stray breeze will cause a rickety house of cards to collapse?
Once a snowballing financial and economic deflation gets underway, it could develop with breathtaking speed. Soon the government, instead of worrying about inflation, would be using desperation measures to halt the collapse, even if it had to run budgetary deficits of 100 billion or more. In the short run, in a pragmatic sense, Washington would simply feel that it was tackling an overriding emergency, relieving hardship, etc. In the long term, what it would be doing was to inflate up to the point where most of the huge debt burden was wiped out, and a fresh start could be made. Of course, this would be at the expense of millions of savers who would lose most of their capital. Hopefully the expropriation would be less drastic than it was in Germany.
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Reprinted from The Nightmare German Inflation by Scientific Market Analysis, 1970.
Editor’s note: By the end of the 1970′s, double digit inflation had ravaged the American financial landscape. This forecast by Scientific Market Analysis was not only accurate, it was prescient, and the conclusions drawn enduring. Only the very strict monetary policies of the Federal Reserve Bank during the 1980′s kept the nation from sliding into the hyperinflationary abyss, and those years became a period of relative calm. The profligate fiscal policies of the United States government, however, continue unabated. The overall national debt has grown to enormous proportions. The defense build-ups of the Reagan and Bush administrations, coupled with the unbridled growth of entitlements — financed to a large degree with government debt—have set the stage for a new round of inflation. Few believe that the Congress or the President possesses the political will to stop the spending. As argued by Scientific Market Analysis in this report, sooner or later, the deficits will translate to inflation, and sooner or later, the Federal Reserve Bank will find it nigh impossible to continue pulling rabbits out of the hat. Whether or not the inflationary tendency of the American economy will cross the line to hyperinflation is primarily a matter of politics—a reality few of us welcome. For the United States to escape the fate of 1924 Germany, we must alter our ways and soon. MK
- Copyright 1999 USAGOLD / Centennial Precious Metals, Inc. All Rights Reserved. No further reproduction without permission.
The Nanny State Can’t Last
Tuesday, April 12, 2011 – by Dr. Ron Paul
Last week, Congress and the administration refused to seriously consider the problem of government spending. Despite the fear-mongering, a government shutdown would not have been as bad as claimed.
It is encouraging that some in Washington seem to be insisting on reduced spending, which is definitely a step in the right direction, but only one step. We have miles to go before we can even come close to a solution, and it will involve completely redefining the role of government in our lives and on the world stage. A compromise was struck at the last minute, but until Democrats agree to rein in entitlement spending, and Republicans back off the blank checks to the military industrial complex, it all amounts to political gamesmanship.
Unfortunately, the compromises always seem to be just the opposite. Instead of the left agreeing to cut social spending and the right agreeing to cut military spending, the right agrees to more welfare and the left agrees to more warfare. In spite of all the rhetoric, we will go deeper in debt, the Fed will print more money, and the value of the dollar will continue to plummet. How long will it be before foreigners stop buying our debt, and hyperinflation arrives? Throughout history, empires have always overextended themselves through conquests and wealth transfers leading to eventual collapse, from the Roman Empire to the Soviet Union. We are headed in the same direction and it seems only the chaos of the collapse of the dollar will stop the spending spree. Arguing over funding for Planned Parenthood and NPR, though important, only shows that leadership in Washington either won’t face reality, or don’t understand how serious the problem is.
Of course, an actual government collapse would create serious problems for many people who have come to depend on government payments for healthcare, retirement income, their children’s education, and even food and housing. However, these so-called entitlement programs are unconstitutional to begin with and have engendered a culture of dependence on wealth transfer payments that is out of control. It concerns me greatly that instead of dealing seriously with our situation, so many in Washington would rather allow the chaos that will ensue when all of the dependent people are suddenly cut off. Better to look reality squarely in the face and tell people the difficult truth that government is simply not capable of managing people’s lives from cradle to grave as was foolishly promised. We face trillions in deficits with any of the budgets under consideration. Keeping those promises is, sadly, just not one of our options in the long run. Better to admit the nanny state is coming to an end and we are no longer working on “compromises” but a transition – to a sustainable way of life, one that respects the constitution, the rule of law and property rights.
Come visit with Mike Maloney in this cutting edge video as he tackles the tough questions about today’s gold and silver cycle, where we are and where are going.
* when to sell your gold and silver
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What is a Gold Kinebar, how can KB GOLD protect me and my family with the coming inflation and dollar revaluationyou will be happy you viewed this information on gold and silver
Populist lawyer, Gary Fielder, presents “The Gig Is Up: Money, the Federal Reserve and You. Live from Wolfe Hall at The University of Colorado School of Law, on December 4, 2008, Mr. Fielder, a criminal and constitutional lawyer from Denver, Colorado, presents a power point and video presentation on the creation of money with an historical analysis of our current banking system. With quotes from Ben Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, Abe Lincoln, Ron Paul, Dennis Kucinich and many others.
Fielder makes his case to abolish the Federal Reserve and return to a sound and honest money system. Fractional Reserve Banking. Currency. Amero. World Government. International Banking. Produced by Jack Creamer, Side 3 Studios, Denver, Colorado. Video edits by Jonathan Ellinoff. Technical Assistant, Rye Miller. This video is for educational purposes only. Admission was not charged, nor will any effort be made to profit from its production or sale. The DVD is free.
